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Abstract: The sensitivity of stock options’ payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides
risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms’ risk more by increasing
systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the
firm’s systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio.
Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their
firms’ total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our
results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue
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systematic risk are available as an alternative.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines how executive stock options (ESOs) give chief executive
officers (CEOs) differential incentives to alter their firms’ systematic and idiosyncratic
risk. Since ESOs give CEOs incentives to alter their firms’ risk profile through both their
sensitivity to stock return volatility, or vega, and their sensitivity to stock price, or delta,
we examine both effects. Although prior empirical studies have examined the relationship
between the incentives provided by ESOs and total firm risk (typically measured as the
volatility of realized stock returns), recent theoretical research shows that it is important
to distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic risk when studying this relationship.
In particular, vega gives risk-averse managers more of an incentive to increase total risk
by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk, since, for a given level of vega, an
increase in systematic risk always results in a greater increase in a CEO’s subjective
value of his or her stock-option portfolio than does an equivalent increase in idiosyncratic
risk. This differential risk-taking incentive stems from CEOs’ ability to hedge any
unwanted increase in their firm’s systematic risk by trading the market portfolio.1 The
above distinction between the two components of risk is important because it suggests
that ESOs might not necessarily induce CEOs to undertake positive net present value
(NPV) projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with
systematic risk are available as an alternative.

1

It is important to note that CEOs will still have these differential risk-taking incentives when they are
precluded from trading the market portfolio. In this case, a CEO’s only source of priced systematic risk is
his or her firm-specific equity holdings. Therefore, a manager who seeks to increase the expected return of
his or her equity portfolio by taking on more systematic risk can do so only by increasing the systematic
risk of his or her firm. Since CEOs are generally presumed to be able to trade the market portfolio (Jin,
2002; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003), we focus on the hedging benefit of taking systematic rather than
idiosyncratic risk.

-1-

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525025

Delta also gives managers incentives to alter the level of their firms’ systematic
and idiosyncratic risk, but, unlike with vega, the direction of the effect is ambiguous. On
one hand, delta gives managers an incentive to reduce their firms’ systematic and
idiosyncratic risk by magnifying their exposure to their firm’s risk. On the other hand,
delta encourages managers to take risks that produce a sufficient increase in firm value or
result in a transfer of wealth from creditors to shareholders (John and John, 1993).
Using a research design that accounts for the endogenous nature of the
relationship between equity incentives and firms’ risk profiles, we find evidence of a
strong positive relationship between CEOs’ equity portfolio vega and the level of both
total and systematic risk. We also find that vega is unrelated to the level of idiosyncratic
risk. Together, these findings suggest that vega gives managers incentives to increase
total risk primarily through increasing systematic risk.
We also find evidence of a strong positive relationship between delta and the level
of both systematic and idiosyncratic (and therefore total) risk, but no evidence of a
differential relationship between delta and these two types of risk. The positive
relationship between delta and idiosyncratic risk is particularly interesting, since, unlike
with systematic risk, increasing idiosyncratic risk does not benefit managers either by
improving their ability to hedge their exposure to their firms’ risk or by increasing the
expected return of their equity portfolio. This result, therefore, provides evidence on the
risk-value tradeoff that managers face and suggests that investing in positive-NPV
projects may require managers to increase their firms’ idiosyncratic risk even though it
cannot be hedged.
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Collectively, our results suggest that vega may not necessarily elicit idiosyncratic
risk-seeking from managers when opportunities to seek systematic risk are available. In a
complementary analysis that speaks more directly to this issue, we examine how ESOs
influence managers’ acquisition decisions. In particular, we examine the subsample of
firms that acquire another firm and compare the risk profile of the entity that results from
combining the acquirer and the actual target with the risk profile of the entity that results
from combining the acquirer and a potential target. This analysis therefore compares
CEOs’ actual risk-taking decisions with alternative decisions that the CEOs could have
made. Our results for this analysis reveal that vega provides CEOs with incentives to
acquire targets that increase their firms’ systematic risk, but not idiosyncratic risk,
relative to other acquisitions they could have made.
Collectively, our findings have important implications for compensation policy
and firm value. The prior literature widely suggests that ESOs can be used to mitigate
managers’ aversion to investing in risky but positive-NPV projects (e.g., Haugen and
Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). To the extent that positive-NPV projects are
primarily characterized by idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk, as suggested by our
findings related to delta and prior empirical evidence, our results indicate that ESOs
might not necessarily induce managers to pursue these projects. 2 Thus, managers’ ability
to hedge the systematic risk of their equity portfolio may limit the efficacy of ESOs to
encourage managers to take idiosyncratic risk when systematic risk is available as an
alternative.

2

For example, Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008) and Vasselou and Abedjinou (2004) suggest that innovation
and the pursuit of growth options manifest in the form of idiosyncratic volatility. Similarly, Pastor and
Veronesi (2009) argue that the risk associated with new technologies is largely idiosyncratic until the
technology is ultimately adopted on a large scale.
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Our findings also raise the possibility that ESOs may induce managers to increase
their firm’s systematic risk, which they can hedge, even if it does not increase firm value.
Doing so can adversely affect shareholders in two ways. First, there could be costs
associated with managerial time and effort spent seeking systematic risk that does not
necessarily increase firm value. Second, as Acharya and Bisin (2009) note, this approach
may lead to excessive systematic risk in equity markets, which may, in turn, lead to
reduced risk-sharing among investors and lower firm values.
Another important contribution of our study is that the specific nature of our
research question and innovations in our research design allow us to better establish a
causal relationship between managers’ equity incentives and firm risk. There are two
distinguishing features of our study in this regard.
First, because our hypothesis provides a differential prediction about the
relationship between equity incentives and the systematic and idiosyncratic components
of risk, concerns about correlated omitted variables that are inherent in research designs
that examine the link between risk-taking incentives and total risk are mitigated.3 In
particular, our empirical findings suggest that if a correlated omitted variable were
responsible for our results, it would have to induce a positive correlation between vega
and systematic risk but not between vega and idiosyncratic risk. Although such a variable
may exist, this requirement precludes otherwise likely candidates for omitted correlated

3

For example, if firms with more growth opportunities use ESOs in lieu of cash to compensate their CEOs,
and these firms are more risky, then an observed relationship between ESOs and firm risk would not
necessarily be causal. Similarly, if firms use ESOs to attract more risk-tolerant CEOs (since these CEOs
will not demand as high of a risk premium for being compensated with risky ESOs), then an observed
relationship between ESOs and firm risk might be a result of a willingness among more risk-tolerant CEOs
to undertake risky projects, rather than because ESOs induce these CEOs to undertake more risk. To the
extent that empirical tests cannot adequately control for growth opportunities, CEO risk tolerance, and
other potentially correlated variables, the estimated relationship between ESOs and firm risk can be
confounded.
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variables (e.g., growth opportunities and executive risk tolerance) and thus enhances the
credibility of our results.
Second, we develop an imputed measure of firm risk, which, compared with the
realized volatility of returns, more directly captures the level and composition of risk that
CEOs want to take. There are several reasons that realized return volatility might not
necessarily capture a CEO’s desired level and composition of firm risk. First, realized
return volatility not only captures the outcome of a CEO’s risk-taking decisions but also
reflects a firm’s disclosures, information trade in the firm’s shares, and other features of
the firm’s information environment (Roll, 1988; Ross, 1989). Since we are interested in
documenting the link between ESOs and CEOs’ risk-taking decisions, this potentiality
introduces the possibility of a spurious correlation between CEOs’ equity incentives and
measures of risk based on realized returns.4 Second, because measures of risk based on
future realized returns require a long time series to estimate, they do not necessarily
reflect managers’ anticipated risk profiles.5,6

4

For example, firms’ disclosure practices, and hence their information environments, are known to be
associated with their CEOs’ incentive structure (Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2004). Further, a firm’s
information environment, in part, determines both realized stock return volatility and its components (Roll,
1988; Bushee and Noe, 2000). Together, these findings suggest that a measure of risk based on realized
stock returns invites the possibility of a spurious correlation between CEO risk-taking incentives and firm
risk.
5
For example, a CEO may experience a change in his or her incentive structure in the future because of
changes in the underlying contracting environment, or the firm may have a new CEO with different equity
incentives. A measure of risk based on future realized returns may partly reflect the choice of assets (or risk
profile) that is optimal given the current CEO's future incentives or the risk preferences of a different CEO,
rather than the current CEO's choice of risk profile based on his or her current incentives.
6
Some studies try to address this concern by examining a sample of firms that make a specific disclosure of
expected future risk (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002) or by examining specific investments such as
research and development and capital expenditures (e.g., Coles et al., 2006). One concern with the former
approach is that confining the analysis to a small sample both limits the ability to generalize the results and,
more importantly, precludes the efficient use of two-stage least squares to estimate the relationship, since
the resulting coefficient estimates are biased in small samples (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995). Given the
endogenous nature of equity incentives, it is crucial to have a large enough sample to allow for two-stage
least squares estimation. Although the latter approach is feasible for large samples, it focuses only on a
specific aspect of firm risk, rather than on aggregate risk. As we discuss later, our measure of firm risk is
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We address this concern by developing an imputed measure of firm risk based on
the portfolio of segments (or industries) in which a firm operates. Our measure views
each industry as an operating asset with a risk profile that is relatively stable over time
and can therefore be estimated using a long time series of industry-level returns. A firm is
treated as a portfolio of industries the CEO chooses to achieve his or her desired level of
systematic and idiosyncratic risk. The CEO can alter the firm’s risk profile by investing
in new industries, divesting from existing industries, or altering the weight of the firm’s
existing industry segments. We infer a CEO’s desired risk profile from the risk profile of
the portfolio of industries in which his or her firm operates. Since the industry-level risk
profiles, upon which our firm-specific measures of risk are based, are less likely to be
influenced by the specific features of firms’ information environments, our measure of
firms’ risk profiles is more likely to reflect CEOs’ anticipated level and composition of
firm risk. We estimate our imputed measure of risk using firms’ business-segment
disclosures, which provide financial information on the portfolio of separately managed
business units within the firm. Our approach for imputing firms’ risk profiles is similar to
that used by several studies on mutual funds that, instead of using actual fund returns,
assess fund performance by examining the performance of the individual stocks the funds
hold (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Grinblatt and Titman, 1993; Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers, 1997).
Another benefit of our imputed measure of risk is that it can be applied to a large
sample of firms and is therefore amenable to empirical techniques to account for the
endogenous relationship between equity incentives and firm risk. We exploit this benefit

both available for a large sample of firms (and is therefore amendable to two-stage least squares estimation)
and captures the aggregate risk profile of the firm.
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of our measure through our use of an expansive sample and our use of two- and threestage least squares (2SLS and 3SLS) estimation in our research design. This approach
allows us not only to account for the endogenous relationship between equity incentives
and firm risk, but also to test for a differential relationship between equity incentives and
the systematic and idiosyncratic components of risk.
The next section of this paper discusses the relevant prior literature and develops
our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design. Section 4 describes the manner
in which we construct our main variables and the data we used in our analysis. We
discuss our results in Section 5 and offer our conclusions in Section 6.

2. Prior literature and hypothesis development
2.1. Executive stock options and total risk
Risk-averse and undiversified managers who have most of their wealth tied to the
value of their firm have an incentive to reject positive net present value projects that are
sufficiently risky. A number of authors have suggested that because the expected payoff
of an option is increasing in the volatility of the underlying stock’s return, compensating
risk-averse managers with stock options will encourage them to take risks (Haugen and
Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). However, subsequent studies (e.g., Lambert,
Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004; Lewellen, 2006) point out
that executives who cannot sell or otherwise hedge the risk associated with their options
will not value them at their market value but will instead value them subjectively through
the lens of their own preferences. Consequently, granting ESOs to a risk-averse executive
may not necessarily increase that executive’s appetite for risk. These studies note that
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stock options not only increase the convexity of a manager’s payoff by increasing the
sensitivity of his or her wealth to firm risk, or vega, but also increase the sensitivity of his
or her wealth to changes in stock price, or delta. And although the increase in vega
unambiguously induces a manager to take more risks, the corresponding increase in delta
magnifies the manager’s aversion to firm risk because a given change in stock price has a
larger impact on the value of the manager’s firm-specific portfolio. Thus, the net effect of
greater option compensation on managerial risk-taking is ambiguous.
These theories motivated a number of early empirical studies, which generally
found a positive relationship between stock options and various measures of firm risk
(e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Defusco, Johnson, and Zorn, 1990; Tufano, 1996;
Schrand and Unal, 1998; Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). More recent studies
(e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009) acknowledge the different theoretical predictions
regarding the relationship between vega and delta and firm risk, and thus account for
them separately in their empirical specifications. Although all of these studies document
a positive relationship between vega and firm risk, they provide mixed evidence on the
relationship between delta and firm risk.7 In contrast to these studies, however, Lewellen
(2006) finds that options actually discourage managerial risk-taking for empirically
plausible parameter values in a certainty-equivalent framework.
Coles et al. (2006), Low (2009), and others note that one possible explanation for
the mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between stock options and firm risk is

7

For example, Coles et al. (2006) report mixed results regarding the effect of delta for various measures of
risk-taking. On one hand, they find that delta is positively associated with firm focus and return volatility,
an outcome that suggests that delta encourages risk-taking. On the other hand, they find that delta makes
managers more risk-averse by encouraging them to increase capital expenditures, decrease R&D
expenditures, and decrease leverage. Low (2009) also concludes that her evidence on the relationship
between delta and managerial risk-taking is inconclusive.
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that because equity incentives and firm risk are endogenously related, the relationship is
difficult to empirically identify. Another possible explanation is that the net effect of
ESOs on risk-taking depends on the empirical values of firm risk and CEO risk aversion,
since, for certain combinations, stock options can provide an incentive to reduce total risk
(Lambert et al., 1991; Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004). As we discuss further below, one
advantage of examining the effect of ESOs on the two components of total risk separately
is that ESOs motivate managers to increase systematic risk for every combination of firm
risk and CEO risk aversion, and that is not necessarily the case for idiosyncratic risk. This
result allows us to construct empirical tests of the relationship between ESOs and risktaking that are less likely to be misspecified as a result of this potentially non-monotonic
relationship that exists for total risk.
2.2. Executive stock options and the components of risk
Several recent theoretical studies (e.g., Tian, 2004; Henderson, 2005; Duan and
Wei, 2005) suggest that it is important to distinguish between systematic and
idiosyncratic risk when studying the relationship between ESOs and firm risk. These
studies show that for a fixed level of total risk, increasing the proportion of systematic
risk unambiguously increases the subjective value of the stock-option holdings of a riskaverse manager who can trade the market portfolio, because a higher proportion of
systematic risk implies that a higher proportion of the firm’s total risk (and therefore a
higher proportion of the risk associated with the manager’s firm-specific holdings) is
correlated with the market and can therefore be hedged.
To further extend this intuition and to facilitate our hypothesis development, we
develop a numerical model that examines the effects of vega on a risk-averse CEO’s
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incentives to alter systematic and idiosyncratic risk, while holding the effect of delta and
total wealth constant. Specifically, we compare several portfolios of stock options,
shares, and cash by simultaneously (1) adding options to the CEO’s portfolio to increase
its vega, (2) removing shares of stock from the CEO’s portfolio to keep its delta constant,
and (3) adding fixed wealth to keep the value of the CEO’s entire holdings (i.e., stock,
options, and cash) constant. The Appendix provides details that underlie the numerical
model that we used to compute the subjective value of these portfolios.
Fig. 1 illustrates the effect of increasing vega on a CEO’s incentives to alter his or
her firm’s risk profile by providing plots of the percentage change in the CEO’s certainty
equivalent of his or her equity portfolio for a given change in either systematic or
idiosyncratic (and therefore total) risk for different levels of vega for four different levels
of CEO risk aversion. Two noteworthy features emerge from this figure. First, consistent
with the intuition from the theoretical literature on the relationship between ESOs and
total risk, Fig. 1 shows that increasing vega while holding delta and total wealth constant
always results in a larger percentage increase in a CEO’s certainty equivalent of his or
her equity portfolio for both types of risk. Thus, vega provides managers with incentives
to increase total risk, regardless of whether the increase comes from systematic or
idiosyncratic risk. This observation leads to our first hypothesis (stated in alternative
form), which predicts a positive relationship between vega and total, systematic, and
idiosyncratic risk.
H1: Vega is positively associated with total risk and its systematic and
idiosyncratic components.
Second, Fig. 1 shows that for a given level of vega, an increase in systematic risk
always results in a greater increase in the CEO’s certainty equivalent of his or her equity
- 10 -

portfolio than does an equivalent increase in idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests
because CEOs can hedge any unwanted increase in their firm’s systematic risk by trading
the market portfolio. This finding leads to our second hypothesis (stated in alterative
form), which predicts that the positive relationship between total risk and vega is driven
more by an increase in systematic risk than by an increase in idiosyncratic risk.
H2: A larger portion of the increase in total risk caused by vega comes from an
increase in systematic risk than from an increase in idiosyncratic risk.
Our first hypothesis is similar to the one tested in previous empirical studies (e.g.,
Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009) and follows
from the theoretical literature on the relationship between ESOs and total risk, which
predicts a positive relationship between vega and any kind of risk. Our second hypothesis
is refined to take into account the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk
and their differential effects on managers’ subjective values of their equity portfolios.
This distinction is important for two reasons. First, it raises the possibility that ESOs
might not necessarily give CEOs incentives to pursue projects that are primarily
characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an
alternative. Second, because the differential nature of risk-taking incentives mitigates
traditional concerns about correlated omitted variables, we can better establish a causal
relationship between managers’ risk-taking incentives and firm risk.
It is also important to note that our second hypothesis about the increase in risk
coming primarily from systematic risk is more robust than is the more general prediction
that stock options provide incentives to increase firm risk. Unlike an increase in total risk,
which can result in a decrease in an executive’s subjective value of his or her options for
certain combinations of risk aversion and firm risk (as noted by Lambert et al., 1991,
- 11 -

Carpenter, 2000, and Ross, 2004), an increase in systematic risk always increases a riskaverse executive’s subjective value of his or her options for every combination of risk
aversion and total firm risk, because it can be hedged.
In addition to providing risk-taking incentives from vega, stock options also give
managers incentives to change their firms’ risk profile through delta. However, unlike the
effect of vega, the effect of delta on the level of total risk and its systematic and
idiosyncratic components is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, delta gives managers
an incentive to reduce total risk and its components by magnifying the concavity of their
utility functions. On the other hand, there are two reasons delta could induce managers to
increase the level of risk. First, delta gives managers an incentive to increase the market
value of their firms’ equity by investing in positive net present value projects, which may,
in turn, require them to increase idiosyncratic and/or systematic risk. Thus, if the
manager’s increase in subjective value that results from the increase in market value
exceeds the decrease in subjective value that results from the associated increase in risk,
then delta may be positively associated with total risk and its systematic and idiosyncratic
components. Second, for levered firms, delta could provide managers with incentives to
invest in riskier projects that benefit shareholders at the expense of their firms’ creditors
(John and John, 1993). Thus, the effect of delta on firms’ total risk and its separate
components is ambiguous, and we consider it to be an empirical issue.

3. Research design
3.1. Risk profile of the firm
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To test our hypotheses, we estimate a series of equations in which we model the
level of total firm risk and its systematic and idiosyncratic components. The equations
that capture firms’ risk profiles are as follows.
Total

Risk

Systematic

t 1

 

Risk

t 1

Idiosyncra tic Risk

  Vega   Delta    i Control i , t  
1
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t
2
t
i

(1)
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  Vega t   Delta    i Control i ,t  
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t 1
2
t
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  Vega t   Delta    i Control i , t  
1
t 1
2
t

(3)

Our first hypothesis that vega encourages CEOs to increase the level of total risk
and its systematic and idiosyncratic components predicts a positive coefficient on vega in
Eq. (1) – (3) (i.e., β1 > 0, γ1 > 0, and δ1 > 0). We formally test our second hypothesis that
the increase in total risk induced by vega comes more from systematic than from
idiosyncratic risk by estimating the systematic- and idiosyncratic-risk equations (i.e., Eq.
(2) and Eq. (3)) simultaneously and predict that the coefficient on vega in Eq. (2) is both
positive and larger than the coefficient on vega in Eq. (3) (i.e., γ1 > 0 and γ1 > δ1). Finally,
since the direction of the relationship between delta and total, systematic, and
idiosyncratic risk is theoretically ambiguous, we do not supply a prediction on the sign of
delta in any of the risk-profile equations.
Our choice of control variables in the risk-profile equations is based primarily on
prior literature. First, we include firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total
annual sales, since prior literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009) has
documented a negative relationship between size and firm risk. Next, we include
leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. On one hand, higher
leverage provides managers with greater incentives to transfer wealth from bondholders
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to shareholders (Leland, 1998), a result that predicts a positive relationship between
leverage and total risk and each of its separate components. On the other hand, a number
of studies (e.g., Friend and Lang, 1998; Lewellen, 2006) have argued and found evidence
consistent with the hypothesis that more risky firms face a higher probability of financial
distress and therefore should have less leverage. This finding also suggests that firms may
offset the increased risk of financial distress that accompanies any increase in leverage by
reducing their operating risk. Given these conflicting hypotheses and the conflicting
evidence in prior studies, we do not supply a prediction on the sign of leverage in any of
the risk-profile equations.
Next, we expect managers of firms with larger investment-opportunity sets and
more growth options to take more risk than would managers of firms with smaller
investment-opportunity sets and fewer growth options (Guay, 1999). We therefore
include the book-to-market ratio, the prior period’s sales growth, and net investment in
property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets to capture variation in firms’
investment and growth opportunities.8 Following Berger et al. (1997) and Guay (1999),
we also include the logarithm of CEO tenure and CEO cash compensation to proxy for
8

Although prior studies frequently use research-and-development expense (R&D) and capital expenditures
(capex) as proxies for a firm’s growth opportunities, we do not include these variables in our risk profile
specifications. If managers alter R&D and capex to achieve their desired level of systematic and
idiosyncratic risk, then including R&D and capex as controls may eliminate the differential risk-taking
effect that we are interested in and thus reduce the power of our empirical tests. Previous literature provides
evidence to support this concern. In particular, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) document a significant
intertemporal relationship between capitalized R&D expense and subsequent stock returns. They interpret
this finding as either a mispricing of the shares of R&D-intensive companies or as compensation for an
extra market-risk factor associated with R&D. Ho, Xu, and Yap (2004) argue that the higher systematic risk
that accompanies R&D-intensive companies can explain this anomaly. In our sample, R&D exhibits a
relatively high (Pearson) correlation of 0.328 with systematic risk, and a negative correlation of -0.111 with
idiosyncratic risk; and capex has a correlation of -0.109 and 0.331, with systematic and idiosyncratic risk,
respectively. In addition, Coles et al. (2006) provide evidence of a positive causal relationship between
risk-taking incentives and R&D and a negative causal relationship between risk-taking incentive and capex.
Thus, the findings from Coles et al. (2006), together with the observed correlation structure in our sample,
are consistent with managers’ use of R&D and capex as discretionary tools to take systematic and
idiosyncratic risk.
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the degree of CEO risk aversion. Although our proxies for investment and growth
opportunities and managerial risk aversion are expected to capture the underlying
constructs to some degree, they are likely to be measured with error. In addition, prior
literature generally does not predict a sign for these variables, so we, too, do not supply a
prediction.
A final issue is how to include industry controls, since the level of total,
systematic, and idiosyncratic risk could vary systematically across industries in a way
that the other control variables do not necessarily capture. Since our research design
views each firm as a portfolio of operating segments with time-varying weights that the
CEO selects, it is not clear what the appropriate industry would be for a multisegment
firm. We follow two complementary approaches to address this issue. First, we estimate
the equations without industry controls. This approach assumes that the remaining control
variables in the model adequately capture the determinants of firms’ risk profiles, absent
the effect of executives’ equity incentives. Second, we follow Denis et al. (1997) and
include industry indicators for all (two-digit SIC) industries in which the firm operates.
This approach treats a firm as a portfolio of segments that potentially operates across
multiple industries.
3.2. Endogenous nature of equity incentives
In addition to ESOs influencing managers’ risk-taking behavior, causality is also
likely to run in the other direction. That is, when designing compensation contracts,
boards are likely to anticipate the effects of CEOs’ equity incentives on their decisions
and will incorporate this expectation into the contract design, so these variables will be
jointly determined. We account for the endogenous nature of compensation contracts in
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our research design using instrumental variables and estimate the risk-profile equations
using two- and three-stage least squares.
Our instruments for equity incentives (i.e., vega and delta) are based on the
determinants identified by prior research that should not have a direct effect on the risk
profile of the firm, but that should have an indirect relationship through their effect on
equity incentives and the other control variables. Core and Guay (1999) find that cashconstrained firms tend to use restricted stock and stock options as substitutes for cash
compensation. Alternatively, firms with greater cash balances are more likely to have
greater agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), which equity incentives can
mitigate (Garvey, 1997). Although the sign of their relationship with equity incentives is
ambiguous, cash constraints are a candidate for an instrument because there is no obvious
reason cash-constrained firms would have systematically different ex ante risk profiles
than would firms that are not cash-constrained. Thus, our first instrument for equity
incentives is the amount of cash and short-term investments scaled by assets, which
captures the short-term availability of cash to make compensation payments (Core and
Guay, 1999).
Our second instrument for equity incentives is a firm’s marginal tax rate. Core
and Guay (1999) argue that when future corporate tax rates are expected to be higher, the
future tax deduction from deferred compensation becomes more valuable relative to the
immediate tax deduction associated with cash compensation. Therefore, ceteris paribus,
equity-based compensation is expected to be less costly for firms with lower marginal tax
rates, and we expect a negative relationship between equity incentives and a firm’s
marginal tax rate. We follow Core and Guay (1999) and proxy for a firm’s marginal tax

- 16 -

rate with an indicator that is equal to one if a firm has a tax-loss carry-forward in any of
the past three years and zero otherwise.
Our final set of instruments is based on the firm’s past performance. If firms
reward managers for their past performance with restricted stock and options, then we
expect past performance to be correlated with equity incentives. However, there is no
obvious reason for an association between past measures of a firm’s performance and a
firm's current risk profile, other than the effect through equity incentives and the control
variables such as leverage.9 Thus, we use the previous two years’ stock returns (Returnt
and Returnt-1) and the previous year’s return on assets (ROA) as our final instruments for
CEO equity incentives.
As with any study that uses instrumental variables, the validity of the resulting
estimates relies on the validity of the exclusion restrictions. Two unique features of our
hypotheses and research design help mitigate concerns about the efficacy of our
instruments. First, the differential nature of our predictions about the effect of vega on
systematic and idiosyncratic risk mitigates typical endogeneity concerns related to
correlated omitted variables. Specifically, since there is no obvious reason why the most
likely candidates for correlated omitted variables in a risk-taking setting (e.g., firms’
growth opportunities and CEO risk tolerance) would have a differential relationship with
the firms’ systematic and idiosyncratic risk, the test of our second hypothesis is less
likely to be biased from any correlated omitted variables of this type. Second, we test the
9

An empirical regularity documented in the literature is the negative relationship between stock returns and
future return volatility. Black (1976) and subsequent authors (e.g., Christie, 1982) have advanced the socalled “leverage effect” view to explain this phenomenon, whereby negative stock returns reduce the value
of the firm’s equity while the amount of debt remains fixed, a situation that results in a higher volatility of
equity returns. The existence of this effect does not invalidate our use of prior returns as an instrument for
leverage, because the effect of prior stock price performance on volatility, or risk, is precisely through its
effect on a firm’s leverage, which is included as a control variable in the risk-profile equations.
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validity of our instruments using Hansen’s (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions and
report the associated J-statistics. A J-statistic that is significantly different from zero
indicates a violation of at least one of the maintained assumptions of the test, including
the assumption that the instruments are exogenous. As we discuss further below, we find
that the J-statistic is not statistically different from zero in most of our specifications, a
result that further supports the validity of our instruments.
Implementation of two-stage least squares (2SLS) requires estimating the
predicted values of the endogenous variables (i.e., vega and delta) by regressing them on
the instruments and the other exogenous controls in the first stage. The predicted values
of the endogenous variables are then used in the second stage to estimate the risk-profile
equations. We interpret the first-stage regressions of equity incentives on the instruments
and the other exogenous controls as contract-design equations, since many of these
variables have also been identified as determinants of equity incentives in their own right.
First, we expect firm size to capture variation in the degree of talent and wealth
across CEOs. Prior literature has argued that larger firms require more talented CEOs and
that CEOs of larger firms tend to be more wealthy (Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and
Guay, 1999). We therefore predict a positive relationship between firm size and the level
of equity incentives. Next, we expect the consequences of excessive managerial risk
aversion (i.e., rejecting risky but positive net present value projects) to be more costly to
shareholders of firms with more investment opportunities. We also expect that it is more
difficult to monitor managers of firms with greater investment opportunities, so equity
incentives will be used as a substitute mechanism for mitigating agency costs in these
firms (Smith and Watts, 1992). We therefore expect both types of equity incentives to be
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negatively associated with the book-to-market ratio and positively associated with the
previous year’s sales growth.
We expect cash compensation to proxy for CEO risk aversion. Guay (1999)
argues that CEOs with higher cash compensation are better able to diversify their
portfolio and will therefore be less risk-averse. Accordingly, CEOs with higher cash pay
should also have higher equity incentives to counteract this risk aversion. Thus, we
predict a positive relationship between the amount of cash compensation and the level of
equity incentives.10 Finally, we expect CEO tenure to capture both CEO experience
(Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) and the degree to which there might be horizon problems as
a result of an anticipated departure (Dechow and Sloan, 1991). Consistent with prior
literature, we predict a positive relationship between CEO tenure and the level of equity
incentives.
3.3. Endogenous nature of leverage
Another concern with the risk-profile equations is that leverage is also likely to be
endogenously determined. This concern is particularly acute in any study that examines
CEO risk-taking incentives, since both a firm’s capital structure and the risk-taking
incentives of its CEO are likely to be jointly determined to produce the desired risk
profile (Coles et al., 2006; Lewellen, 2006). We therefore adapt our research design to
also account for the endogenous nature of firm leverage. We do so by using the firm’s
recent performance, measured as the previous two years’ stock returns and the previous
year’s return on assets as instruments for leverage. These measures of firm performance
should exhibit a positive relationship with a firm’s total assets, which is the denominator
10

Since cash compensation is likely to be decided at the same time as the optimal level of equity incentives,
it is possible that cash compensation is also endogenous. We therefore re-estimate our analyses excluding
cash compensation and find that our reported results are virtually unchanged.
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of our measure of leverage, and are therefore relevant instruments. As we previously
discussed, there is no obvious reason to expect a direct relationship between our measures
of a firm’s past performance and its current risk profile, which suggests that these are
valid instruments.

4. Variable measurement and sample selection
4.1. Measurement of firm risk
Most studies measure total risk as the volatility of future returns and disaggregate
it into its systematic and idiosyncratic components using either the CAPM or some other
affine asset-pricing model (e.g., the Fama and French, 1993 model). This approach can be
problematic when studying the effect of CEO risk-taking incentives because future
realized volatility reflects not only the outcome of a CEO’s risk-taking decisions, but also
the firm’s disclosures, information trade in the firm’s shares, and other features of the
firm’s information environment. In addition, a CEO may experience a change in his or
her incentive structure in the future because of changes in the underlying contracting
environment, or the firm may have a new CEO with different risk preferences. A measure
of risk based on future realized returns would not necessarily reflect the current CEO’s
risk preferences based on his or her current incentive structure and may instead introduce
a spurious correlation between risk-taking incentives and firm risk. We therefore
construct imputed measures of the systematic and idiosyncratic risk that the CEO would
have anticipated using information about the current portfolio of segments in which the
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firm operates.11 A firm is considered as a portfolio of industries the CEO chooses to
achieve his or her desired level of systematic and idiosyncratic risk. The CEO can alter
the firm’s risk profile by investing in new industries, divesting from existing industries,
and altering the weight of the firm’s existing industry segments.12
To construct our measures of firm risk, we gather information about the operating
segments and the book value of assets in those segments from the Compustat Industry
Segment Database, where industry segments are defined at the two-digit SIC level.13 We
let nj denote the number of industry segments in which firm j operates at the end of the
fiscal year, Aij denote the book value of assets of the ith segment of firm j, and Aj denote
the total book value of firm j. Next we define rit as the month t return for the ith industry
segment, calculated as a value weighted-average of the monthly returns of all firms in the
Compustat database that operate exclusively in segment i at the end of the fiscal year, and
rm,t as the monthly return of the market portfolio for month t. We compute rit only for
those segment years for which there are at least three firms that operate solely in industry

11

In untabulated analyses that use the volatility of future realized returns rather than our imputed measure
of firm risk, we find that all of our primary results continue to hold, although sometimes with diminished
statistical significance.
12
An alternative mechanism by which managers can alter the level and composition of their exposure to
their firm’s risk is through personally hedging their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. However, this is
expected to be a second-order effect, since firms severely restrict managers’ ability to directly hedge
idiosyncratic risk through financial transactions. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the incidence of
hedging firm-specific risk among managers is very low. For example, Jagolinzer, Matsunaga, and Yeung
(2007) find that insiders initiated only 203 prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions, which allow
insiders to hedge firm-specific risk, between August 8, 1996, and June 30, 2004. Similarly, Bettis, Bizjak,
and Lemmon (2001) find only 87 zero-cost collar transactions and two equity-swap transactions by insiders
at 65 firms from January 1996 through December 1998. Finally, Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) find
that a majority of the firms in their sample have policies restricting insider trading.
13
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (“Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise
and Related Information,” 1997) adopts the “management approach” to identifying and reporting operating
segments on the basis of how management segments the company for making operating decisions. In
general, under this approach, an operating segment is a component of a company (1) that engages in
activities for which it earns revenues and expenses, (2) whose results undergo regular review to assess
performance and to allocate resources within the firm, and (3) for which financial performance is available
based on the firm’s financial-reporting system.
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i. Finally, we define rj,t as the imputed monthly return for firm j at time t according to the
following equation:
n

r j,t 
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We calculate the variance of imputed monthly returns, rj,t, over the previous 60
months, and require at least 20 months, as our measure of total risk. We then disaggregate
total risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic components by regressing imputed monthly
returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors as follows.
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This equation is estimated for each firm at the beginning of each year using the
returns imputed from Eq. (5).14 We then calculate our measure of systematic risk as the
square root of the explained variance and our measure of idiosyncratic risk as the square
root of the unexplained variance. We use these adjusted measures of systematic and
idiosyncratic risk rather than their more common counterparts (i.e., β1,j) as a measure of
systematic risk because our approach makes both measures more comparable in terms of
scale. This comparability, in turn, allows for a more direct test of our second hypothesis
by comparing the estimated coefficients on vega and delta across Eq. (2) and Eq. (3).
14

Note that the book-value weights of the segments in which a firm operates remain constant during the
period in which we estimate Eq. (5) for a particular fiscal year. However, these weights can and do vary
across fiscal years. For example, consider a firm that operates in two-digit SIC segments A and B at the end
of 2005 with book-value weights of xA, 2005 and xB, 2005, respectively. Let rtA and rtB denote the valueweighted return during month t of all of the single-segment firms that operate exclusively in segment A and
segment B, respectively, during month t. To compute our risk measures at the end of 2005, we first obtain
rtA and rtB for each of the 60 months before December 2005. The firm’s imputed monthly returns for each
month during the estimation window are then computed as rt = (xA, 2005*rtA) + (xB, 2005*rtB), where the
weights xA and xB are held constant during the entire estimation window. Finally, these imputed monthly
returns are used to estimate Eq. (5) to obtain our measures of the firm’s risk profile at the end of 2005. To
further illustrate, suppose that at the end of 2006 the firm continues to operate in segments A and B but
with book value weights of xA, 2006 and xB, 2006, respectively. We would obtain our measures of the firm’s
risk profile at the end of 2006 by repeating the above calculation with the new weights, x A, 2006 and xB, 2006.
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Total risk is measured as the standard deviation of imputed monthly returns. Because of
the highly skewed distributions of these risk measures, we use the natural logarithm of
the measures when estimating the risk-profile equations.
4.2. Measurement of equity incentives
We follow prior literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009) and
measure executives’ equity portfolio vega as the change in the risk-neutral (i.e., BlackScholes) value of the executive’s option portfolio for a 0.01 change in the standard
deviation of the underlying stock returns.15 Similarly, we follow prior literature (e.g.,
Core and Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006) and measure executives’ equity portfolio delta
as the change in the risk-neutral value of the executive’s equity portfolio for a 1% change
in the price of the underlying stock.16,17 Since both delta and vega are highly skewed, we
follow prior literature and use the natural logarithm of both variables in our analysis.
4.3. Sample selection

15

Guay (1999) shows that the vega from shares of stock is insignificant for all but the most financially
distressed firms, where equity becomes more like an at-the-money option. Consequently, the vega from a
CEO’s option portfolio is several orders of magnitude larger than the vega from the CEO’s stock portfolio.
Following prior literature (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009), we ignore vega from stock holdings and
measure risk-taking incentives as the vega of the CEO’s option portfolio.
16
The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is
calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns over the previous 60 months, with a minimum
of 12 months of returns, and winsorized at the fifth and 95th percentiles. If the stock has traded for less than
one year, we use the imputed average volatility of the firms in the S&P 1500. The risk-free rate is
calculated using the interpolated interest rate on a Treasury note with the same maturity (to the closest
month) as the remaining life of the option, multiplied by 0.70 to account for the prevalence of early
exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 12 months scaled by the stock
price at the beginning of the month. This is essentially the same method Core and Guay (2002) describe.
17
An alternative to the dollar-holdings measure of the incentive to increase stock price is the fractionalholdings measure, calculated as the change in the (risk-neutral) value of the executive’s equity portfolio for
a $1,000 change in firm value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Baker and Hall (2004) and Core, Guay, and
Larcker (2003) discuss how the suitability of each measure is context-specific and depends on how the
CEO’s actions affect firm value. When the CEO’s actions affect the dollar returns of the firm (e.g.,
consuming perquisites), the fractional holdings are the appropriate measure of incentives. When the CEO’s
actions affect the percentage returns of the firm (e.g., decisions about corporate strategy), the dollarholdings measure is the appropriate measure of CEO incentives. Since we are concerned about strategic
actions that affect the firm’s risk profile, we rely on the dollar-holdings measure of incentives.
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Our sample is constructed from four primary data sources. First, we obtain data
on CEO compensation and equity portfolio holdings from the ExecuComp database.
Second, we obtain data on the segments in which our sample firms operate from the
Compustat Industry Segment Database. Third, we gather stock return and Treasury bond
yield data from CRSP. Finally, we gather financial statement information from
Compustat. Consistent with prior literature, we exclude financial service firms and
utilities.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the primary variables in our analysis.
Our final sample consists of 13,233 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2007, for which
the required data are available. To ensure that outliers do not drive our results, we
winsorize vega, delta, leverage, book-to-market ratio, cash compensation, and PP&E at
the first and 99th percentiles. The mean (median) systematic and idiosyncratic risk of our
sample firm is 0.06 and 0.04 (0.05 and 0.04), respectively, and both variables have a
relatively symmetric distribution. Table 1 also shows that our sample consists of
relatively large firms with mean and median annual sales of roughly $4.427 billion and
$1.091 billion, respectively. These results are consistent with previous studies that use
ExecuComp.
Table 1 also reveals that the CEOs in our sample have relatively large portfolio
equity incentives. In particular, a 1% increase in stock price results in a mean (median)
increase in the risk-neutral value of their equity portfolio of roughly $718,000
($207,000). We also find that a 0.01 increase in the standard deviation of returns results
in a mean and median increase in the risk-neutral option portfolio value of roughly
$100,000 and $38,000, respectively. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Core and Guay,
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1999; Coles et al., 2006), both variables are highly skewed, but their log-transformed
counterparts are more normally distributed. Finally, the mean (and, to a lesser extent,
median) equity-incentive values are considerably larger than are the values reported in
previous studies, such as those from Core and Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002),
and Coles et al. (2006). This difference is likely due to our use of a more recent sample
period, during which there was an increase in the use of equity-based compensation and
growth in the magnitude of executive compensation packages.

5. Results
5.1. Firm risk profile with endogenous incentive contracts
We present our first set of results in Table 2, where we treat CEO incentives as
endogenous and estimate the contract-design and risk-profile equations using 2SLS.
Panel A presents the first-stage contract design equations for both vega and delta,
respectively. The first two columns present results when industry indicators are excluded
from the specification, and the second two columns present results when industry
indicators are included.
The coefficients in these equations generally have the predicted sign and are
consistent with findings in prior research. Specifically, we find a positive and significant
coefficient on the natural logarithm of sales in both the vega and delta equations, which
indicates that CEOs of larger firms have more of both types of equity incentives. We also
find a strong negative relationship between book-to-market and both vega and delta,
which indicates that the CEOs of firms with more growth opportunities have more equity
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incentives. Finally, we find a strong positive relationship between cash compensation and
both vega and delta.
The instruments excluded from the second-stage risk regressions but included in
the contract-design equations are Cash, TaxLoss, ROA, Returnt, and Returnt-1. We find
that in both contract-design equations, these instruments are generally of the predicted
sign and are statistically significant, which suggests that these are valid instruments. For
example, we find a positive and significant coefficient on Cash, which suggests that firms
with larger cash balances use equity incentives to mitigate agency problems (Garvey,
1997). The partial F-statistic is highly significant in all four equations, which indicates
that, collectively, the instruments provide a significant degree of incremental explanatory
power and, thus, that our results should not be susceptible to biases from weak
instruments. This assessment is further confirmed by the partial R2 of 2.1% (1.4%) and
1.3% (1.5%) in the vega and delta equations, respectively, when industry indicators are
excluded (included).
Panel B of Table 2 presents estimates of the risk-profile equations from the
second-stage regression. The first two columns model the level of total risk. Consistent
with prior literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006;
Low, 2009), we find that the coefficient on vega is positive and significant, both without
and with industry controls, with coefficients of 0.115 and 0.079, respectively, and tstatistics of 2.86 and 3.81, respectively. In the third and fourth columns, in which we
model the level of systematic risk, we find that the coefficient on vega is positive and
significant both without and with industry controls, with coefficients of 0.149 and 0.125,
respectively, and t-statistics of 3.23 and 4.43, respectively. In the next two columns, we
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find that vega exhibits no statistical relationship with the level of idiosyncratic risk either
with or without industry controls. The results in the total and systematic risk equations
are consistent with our first hypothesis, which predicts a positive relationship between
vega and total risk and its systematic and idiosyncratic components. However, we do not
find a significant relationship between vega and idiosyncratic risk. One possible
explanation for this finding is that vega does not induce managers to seek idiosyncratic
risk when enough opportunities to increase systematic risk are available, possibly because
an increase in systematic risk always results in a greater increase in managers’ subjective
value of his or her option portfolio than does an equivalent increase in idiosyncratic risk.
Our second hypothesis predicts that a larger proportion of the increase in total risk
induced by vega comes from systematic than from idiosyncratic risk. A formal test of this
hypothesis involves comparing the magnitude of the coefficients on systematic and
idiosyncratic risk. Although the results in Panel B of Table 2 suggest that the coefficient
on vega is larger than its counterpart in the idiosyncratic-risk equation, we cannot
formally compare coefficients across these equations since they have been estimated
independently of each other. We therefore simultaneously estimate the systematic- and
idiosyncratic-risk equations using three-stage least squares (3SLS), with the results
presented in Table 3. We find that the coefficient on vega in the systematic-risk equation
is significantly greater than the coefficient on vega in the idiosyncratic-risk equation in
both the specification that excludes and includes industry controls (z-statistics of 3.41 and
4.36, respectively). These results are consistent with our second hypothesis and indicate
that vega gives CEOs stronger incentives to increase systematic risk than to increase
idiosyncratic risk.
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We also find a positive and significant relationship between delta and total risk
and its systematic and idiosyncratic components both with and without industry controls
in the 2SLS specification in Panel B of Table 2. These results suggest that increasing both
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk leads to an increase in equity value. The positive
relationship between delta and idiosyncratic risk is particularly noteworthy since, unlike
systematic risk, increasing idiosyncratic risk does not benefit a manager either through an
improved ability to hedge his or her firm-specific wealth, or by increasing the expected
return of his or her equity portfolio. This result speaks to the risk-value tradeoff managers
face and suggests that investing in positive-NPV projects may require managers to
increase unhedgeable idiosyncratic risk. In other words, for the firms in our sample,
higher incentives to increase equity value (by investing in positive-NPV projects)
provided by delta, on average, outweighs CEOs’ increased aversion to idiosyncratic risk
that results from higher delta. Finally, in Table 3 we find that the coefficient on delta in
the systematic risk equation is not significantly different from the coefficient on delta in
the idiosyncratic-risk equation in either specification, which suggests that delta gives
CEOs similar incentives to increase systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
One concern with the results in Panel B of Table 2 is that the J-statistic is
significant in the equations that model the level of idiosyncratic risk but insignificant in
the equations that model the level of systematic and total risk. Since Hansen’s (1982) test
is a joint specification test of all the maintained assumptions of the estimation technique,
a significant J-statistic indicates that at least one of the maintained assumptions is
violated. In this case, a significant value of the J-statistic could result from incorrectly
assuming that leverage is exogenous in its relationship with firm risk. We address this
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concern in the next section by taking into account the potentially endogenous nature of
leverage when estimating the risk equations.
5.2. Firm risk profile with endogenous incentive contracts and leverage
Our next analysis further refines the research design in the previous section by
treating firm leverage as endogenous in addition to CEO equity incentives. As discussed
above, firm leverage and CEO equity incentives are likely to be jointly determined to
achieve the firm’s desired risk profile. Accordingly, treating leverage as exogenous
potentially leads to biased estimates of the relationship between equity incentives and
firms’ risk profiles. We therefore model the amount of leverage as endogenously
determined in this analysis.
The results of the first-stage contract design and leverage equations are presented
in Panel A of Table 4 and are similar to those presented in Panel A of Table 2. In the
leverage equation, we find that the predetermined variables generally exhibit an intuitive
relationship with leverage. For example, we find that leverage is increasing in size and
capital intensity (i.e., Log(Sales) and PP&E, respectively) and deceasing in growth
opportunities (i.e., Book-to-Market). We also find that the signs of the coefficients on the
instruments in the leverage equation are generally consistent with our predictions. In
addition, the relatively high partial F-statistics (73.91 and 64.53, respectively) and partial
R2s (11.0% and 10.3%, respectively) in the equations, both without and with industry
indicators, indicate that our instruments add significant explanatory power to the firststage regressions and are therefore relevant.
The results of the second-stage risk-profile equations presented in Panel B of
Table 4 continue to provide support for both of our hypotheses. In particular, we find that

- 29 -

vega exhibits a positive and significant relationship with the level of total and systematic
risk, but not the level of idiosyncratic risk. This finding is consistent with our first
hypothesis and again suggests that although vega provides CEOs with incentives to
increase risk, they might not necessarily induce CEOs to increase idiosyncratic risk when
systematic risk is available as an alternative. In Table 5, we present the results of 3SLS
estimation, which provides a formal test of our second hypothesis by allowing us to
compare the estimated coefficients of vega across the systematic- and idiosyncratic-risk
equations. The results indicate that the coefficient on vega is significantly higher in the
systematic-risk equation than in the idiosyncratic-risk equation in both specifications.
This finding is consistent with our second hypothesis and the results presented in Table 3.
Finally, consistent with the 2SLS results presented in Table 2, in Table 4 we find
that delta is positive and significantly related to total risk and both its systematic and
idiosyncratic components. Also consistent with the results in Table 3, the 3SLS results in
Table 5 show that the coefficient on delta in the systematic-risk equation is not
significantly different from its counterpart in the idiosyncratic-risk equation in either
specification, which again suggests that delta does not provide CEOs with differential
risk-taking incentives. Collectively, our findings in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that delta
provides CEOs with similar incentives to take risk of either type to increase stock price.
Unlike the second-stage results presented in Panel B of Table 2, where we treat
firm leverage as exogenous, we find that the magnitude of the J-statistic in this
specification is considerably lower and no longer significant at conventional levels in five
out of the six specifications in Panel B of Table 4. The diminished value and significance
of the J-statistics in this specification, in which we also model leverage as endogenous,
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suggests that leverage is not exogenous, as was assumed in the earlier specifications. An
insignificant J-statistic also provides evidence of the validity of our instruments, since it
implies that our maintained assumption that the instruments are exogenous is unlikely to
have been violated.
To allay any potential concerns related to the use of weak instruments, we also
estimate just-identified versions of the risk-profile equations using only Casht, ROAt, and
Returnt as instruments. Just-identified estimates are approximately median-unbiased and
therefore unlikely to be subject to the traditional weak-instrument critiques (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009a and 2009b). Untabulated results reveal that our inferences continue to
hold in the just-identified systems, a finding that suggests that the results in Table 4 are
not likely to be an artifact of weak instruments.
Another concern with our instrumental variables approach is the use of firms’
cash balances as an instrument for equity incentives since cash balances might be jointly
managed with firms’ risk profiles. In particular, if firms that decide to pursue risky
ventures also decide to keep a larger cash cushion on hand to avoid financial distress, and
at the same time grant more equity incentives to reduce the agency problems associated
with free cash flow, it would not be a valid instrument. We ensure that this scenario is not
responsible for our results in two ways. First, since prior theoretical and empirical
literature argues that it is financially constrained firms that maintain precautionary cash
balances (e.g., Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Denis and Sibilkov 2010), we remove variation in cash
balances related to precautionary savings by regressing firms’ cash balance on Hadlock
and Pierce’s (2010) size-age index of financial constraints. We then use the residual from
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this regression as an instrument and find that our reported results are robust to using
residual cash balances as an alternative instrument. Second, we replace cash balances
with two additional lags of operating and stock-price performance as alternative
instruments and also find that our primary conclusions are unaltered.
In addition to our use of instrumental variables, the specific nature of our research
question and our findings also help mitigate concerns about omitted variables that are
correlated with both the use of ESOs and a firm’s risk profile (e.g., the firm’s growth
opportunities or the CEO’s risk tolerance). Such a correlated omitted variable would have
to induce a positive correlation between vega and systematic risk but no correlation
between vega and idiosyncratic risk to confound our estimates. Although such a variable
could exist, this requirement precludes otherwise likely candidates for omitted correlated
variables (e.g., growth opportunities and executive risk tolerance) and thus enhances the
reliability of our results.
5.3. Acquisition analysis
Our earlier findings suggest the possibility that vega might not necessarily induce
CEOs to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when
projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative. We therefore conduct a
complementary analysis that speaks directly to this possibility by examining a subsample
of firms that engage in acquisitions. An acquisition setting is a useful one in which to
examine differential risk-taking (and foregone risk-taking opportunities) because it
allows us to identify not only the actual target that was acquired but also other potential
targets that could have been acquired. We then compare the resulting risk profile of the
acquirer and actual target with the risk profile that would have resulted if the CEO had
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instead acquired another similar target. This comparison allows us to directly assess the
effect of CEOs’ equity incentives on their choice of risk-taking decisions from the menu
of alternative choices that would have been available.
We start by gathering information on the acquisition activity of our sample firms
from the SDC Platinum database, and we combine multiple deals pertaining to the same
acquirer and target that are less than one year apart into a single deal. We then match the
actual target with a potential target that operates in the same (two-digit SIC) industry and
has the closest market capitalization at the end of the month before the acquisition
announcement as the firm that was acquired. We then create three indicator variables that
compare the imputed risk profile of the combined acquirer and actual target with what
the combined risk profile would have been if the acquirer had instead acquired the
matched potential target.18 Each indicator variable corresponds to each of the three riskprofile measures (i.e., total, idiosyncratic, and systematic risk) and takes a value of one if
the risk-profile measure of the combined acquirer and actual target is greater than what it
would have been if the acquirer had instead acquired the matched potential target, and
zero otherwise. We then estimate three probit models in which we regress each of the
three indicator variables on the CEOs’ equity incentives (i.e., vega and delta) and control
variables, which are measured at the end of the closest fiscal year before the
announcement date of the acquisition for which data are available, but no earlier than two
18

Our methodology for imputing the risk profile of the entity obtained by combining acquirer with either
the actual or a potential target is analogous to the one used in our primary analysis. In particular, we
consider the acquirer and target as a portfolio of two assets and obtain the time series of portfolio returns by
market-value-weighting the monthly returns of the acquirer and the target for up to 60 months before
announcement of the acquisition. The market-value weights are estimated at the end of the month before
the acquisition announcement and are held constant during the 60-month estimation window for imputed
returns. If the target is a non-publicly traded subsidiary of a publicly traded parent firm, we use the stock
returns of the parent firm to compute the imputed returns of the portfolio. We then estimate the risk profile
of the combined entity by estimating the three-factor Fama-French model on this time series of monthly
returns.
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years before the announcement date. Our final sample consists of 3,559 acquisitions for
which we have the required information to measure equity incentives and the control
variables. To account for the endogenous nature of the relationship between equity
incentives and leverage, and firms’ risk profiles, we follow our earlier analysis and
instrument for equity incentives and leverage. However, since this is a non-linear probit
model, we estimate it using Newey’s minimum chi-squared two-step estimator (Newey,
1987) rather than 2SLS.
One potential concern with our research design in this analysis is that the
procedure used to identify a potential target does not explicitly take into account
acquisition synergies, which are inherently unobservable for potential targets. However,
this is unlikely to be a source of significant concern for two reasons. First, there is no
obvious reason why our matching procedure would identify potential targets such that the
differential acquisition synergies associated with the actual target and the potential target
are systematically correlated with the equity incentives of the acquirers’ CEOs. Second,
since we estimate the probit models using instrumental variables, this should mitigate
concerns about biases induced by potential omitted correlated variables of this nature.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6. In the first two columns we
find that vega significantly increases the probability that CEOs make acquisitions that
increase their firms’ total risk relative to other potential acquisitions that they could have
made. Most importantly, in the last four columns, we find that CEOs with higher vega are
more likely to acquire firms that increase their firms’ systematic risk, but not
idiosyncratic risk, relative to other firms they could have acquired. These findings
provide further evidence that vega may not induce managers to increase their firms’
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idiosyncratic risk when opportunities to increase their firms’ systematic risk are instead
available.
We also find that delta significantly increases the probability that CEOs make
acquisitions that increase their firms’ idiosyncratic risk relative to alternative acquisitions
they could have made. However, we do not find evidence that delta affects the probability
that CEOs make acquisitions that affect either the level of systematic or total risk relative
to alternative potential acquisitions. These results corroborate our earlier findings (in
Tables 2 and 4) and indicate that delta provides managers with incentives to increase
idiosyncratic risk. These results also speak directly to the risk-value tradeoff, since they
suggest that delta induces managers to choose value-increasing acquisitions even if they
increase their firms’ undiversifiable idiosyncratic risk.
Collectively, our findings in an acquisition setting complement our earlier results
and have important implications for compensation policy and firm value. Prior literature
has argued that ESOs can be used to mitigate managers’ aversion to investing in risky but
positive-NPV projects. Our results qualify this argument and imply that to the extent the
positive-NPV projects are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, ESOs might not
necessarily induce managers to pursue these projects when projects with systematic risk
are available as an alternative.

6. Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between the risk-taking incentives provided
by executive stock options and the systematic and idiosyncratic components of firm risk.
Theory suggests that vega gives risk-averse managers more of an incentive to increase
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total risk by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk, since, for a given level of
vega, an increase in systematic risk always results in a greater increase in a CEO’s
subjective value of his or her stock-option portfolio than does an equivalent increase in
idiosyncratic risk. This differential risk-taking incentive manifests because a CEO who
can trade the market portfolio can hedge any unwanted increase in the firm’s systematic
risk. Consistent with this prediction, we provide evidence of a strong positive relationship
between vega and the level of both total and systematic risk. However, we do not find
vega and idiosyncratic risk to be significantly related.
ESOs also give CEOs incentives to alter their firms’ risk profile through their
sensitivity to stock price, or delta. We find that delta is positively related to the level of
both systematic and idiosyncratic, and therefore total, risk. The positive relationship
between delta and idiosyncratic risk is particularly noteworthy and suggests that investing
in positive-NPV projects may require managers to increase idiosyncratic risk even though
it cannot be hedged.
Our results challenge the popular belief that ESOs can be used to overcome riskaverse CEOs’ aversion to investing in risky but positive-NPV projects. Our findings
suggest that ESOs may not necessarily induce CEOs to undertake positive-NPV projects
if these projects are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk and opportunities to
increase systematic risk are available. Our findings also raise the possibility that ESOs
may induce managers to increase their firms’ systematic risk, which they can hedge, even
if it does not increase firm value. This can adversely affect shareholders in two ways.
First, there could be costs associated with managerial time and effort spent seeking
systematic risk that does not necessarily increase firm value. Second, it could lead to
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excessive systematic risk in equity markets, which may, in turn, lead to reduced risksharing among investors and lower firm values.
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Appendix
This appendix describes the model (based closely on Tian, 2004) and the
numerical procedure used to calculate the certainty equivalent of a CEO’s portfolio for
generating Fig. 1. We begin by assuming that the CEO is risk-averse and his or her
preferences can be represented with the power utility function, u ( w ) 

w

1 a

1 a

, where w is

the CEO’s terminal wealth and a is the CEO’s coefficient of relative risk aversion. The
CEO can invest (both long and short) his or her cash wealth in both the risk-free asset and
the market portfolio. The CEO’s problem is to maximize his or her expected utility by
optimally allocating his or her cash wealth between the risk-free asset and the market
portfolio given the risk profile of the firm.
Letting w0 denote the CEO’s initial cash wealth, n denote the number of stock
options, q denote the number of shares, and m denote the fraction of CEO’s cash wealth
that he or she invests in the market portfolio, we can write the CEO’s end-of-period
wealth as
~ ( m , n , q )  w m (1  ~
w
rm )  w 0 (1  m )(1  r f )  n . max( ~
s  k , 0 )  q .~
s
0

,

where ~rm is the return on the market portfolio, r f is the return on the risk-free asset, ~s is
the firm’s end-of-period stock price, and k is the exercise price of the stock options. The
CEO chooses m to maximize the expected utility of his or her terminal wealth. The
CEO’s maximum expected utility, EU * ( n , q ) , from optimally allocating his or her cash
wealth between the risk-free asset and the market portfolio can be expressed as
EU ( n , q )  Max
*

~ ( m , n , q ))}
E {u ( w

m

.

The certainty equivalent of the CEO’s portfolio can be written as
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1

CE ( n , q )  [(1  a ) EU ( n , q )]
*

1 a

.

This model does not have a closed-form solution because of the nonlinear payoff
of the stock options. Therefore, to solve for the CEO’s certainty equivalent of his or her
portfolio, which we use to generate Fig. 1, we simulate the price process for the market
portfolio and firm’s stock and solve the CEO’s optimization problem numerically. To
perform these simulations, we assume that the firm’s end-of-period stock price and the
market portfolio follow a joint geometric Brownian motion described by
1 2
~
s  s 0 exp(  s   s   s ~s )
2
1 2
~
M  M 0 exp(  m   m   m ~m )
2
,

where s0 and M0 are the firm’s initial stock price and the initial value of the market
portfolio, respectively;  s and  s are the expected return and the volatility of the firm’s
stock;  m and  m are the expected return and the volatility of the market portfolio; and
~s and ~m are joint normal shocks with correlation ρ. We further assume that the firm’s

expected return is given by the Capital Asset Pricing Model:
 s  rf   ( m  rf )

 


m

s

.

The specific parameterization of the above model used to generate Fig. 1 is described in
its caption.

- 43 -

Figure 1
Change in Subjective Value of Equity Portfolio as a Function of
Vega for Changes in Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
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This figure displays a CEO’s incentives to alter his or her firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic risk while
holding the other constant for different levels of vega and CEO risk aversion. Risk-taking incentives are
measured as the percentage change in the subjective value, or certainty equivalent, of the CEO’s portfolio
for a 0.05 change in either the systematic or idiosyncratic volatility of firm’s stock returns while holding
the other constant. The CEO is assumed to have power utility with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of
either two, four, six, or eight (moving clockwise starting from the top left panel). This analysis alters the
vega (i.e., the sensitivity of the options’ Black-Scholes value to changes in return volatility) of the CEO’s
firm-specific equity portfolio while holding both the market value of the CEO’s total wealth constant at $10
million and the delta (i.e., the sum of the sensitivity of the options’ Black-Scholes value and shares’ market
value to changes in stock price) of the CEO’s firm-specific equity portfolio constant at $300,000. Thus, for
a given number of options, the number of shares held by the CEO is calculated to keep the CEO’s equity
portfolio delta equal to $300,000, and the CEO’s outside wealth is then determined such that his or her total
wealth is equal to $10 million. The CEO’s options are assumed to be at-the-money, and the CEO optimally
allocates his or her outside wealth (both long and short) between the risk-free asset and the market portfolio
to maximize his or her expected utility. The certainty equivalent of the CEO’s portfolio is computed by
simulating the model described in the Appendix for a daily holding period. The annualized parameters for
the stock-price process and the market-value process are as follows: stock price = $30; idiosyncratic-return
volatility = 30%; systematic-return volatility = 30%; market-return volatility = 20%; market-risk premium
= 7%; risk-free rate = 2%.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Standard
Deviation

10th
Percentile

50th
Percentile

90th
Percentile

Total Risk

0.07

0.03

0.04

0.06

0.12

Systematic Risk

0.06

0.03

0.03

0.05

0.10

Idiosyncratic Risk

0.04

0.02

0.02

0.04

0.06

Vega ($000s)

100

174

3

38

252

Delta ($000s)

718

1,799

31

207

1,505

Tenure (years)

8

8

1

6

18

1,168

1,011

368

873

2,300

Sales ($ millions)

4,427

13,041

173

1,091

9,287

Book-to-Market

0.61

0.26

0.27

0.60

0.96

Leverage

0.22

0.17

0.00

0.20

0.44

Growth

0.11

0.22

-0.10

0.09

0.34

PP&E

0.30

0.22

0.07

0.24

0.64

Cash

0.14

0.17

0.01

0.07

0.40

TaxLoss

0.36

0.48

0.00

0.00

1.00

ROA

0.05

0.11

-0.05

0.06

0.16

Return

0.19

0.64

-0.36

0.10

0.74

Risk Profile Measures

CEO Characteristics

Cash Compensation ($000s)
Firm Characteristics

This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample of 13,223 firm years from 1992 to 2007 in which
the primary variables are grouped according to Risk Profile Measures, CEO Characteristics, and Firm
Characteristics. Firm risk is measured using the imputed monthly returns based on the industry segments in
which the firm operates and is estimated using the three Fama and French factors as described in Section 4.
Systematic Risk is the square root of the variance of firm returns explained by the Fama-French three-factor
model. Idiosyncratic Risk is the square root of the residual variance from the Fama-French three-factor
model. Total Risk is the standard deviation of firm returns. Vega is the change in the risk-neutral value of
the CEO’s portfolio of stock options for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of the return of the
underlying stock. Delta is the change in the risk-neutral value of the CEO’s equity portfolio of stock and
options for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock. Tenure is the number of years in which the
current CEO has held his or her office. CashCompensation is the total value of cash the CEO received
during the year. Sales is the firm’s annual revenue. Book-to-Market is the ratio of book value to market
value of total assets. Leverage is the book value of total long-term debt scaled by total assets. Growth is the
growth in annual sales over the prior year. PP&E is the net plant, property, and equipment scaled by total
assets. Cash is the firm’s total cash balance scaled by total assets. TaxLoss is an indicator variable equal to
one if a firm has tax-loss carry-forwards in any of the past three years and zero otherwise. ROA is net
income scaled by beginning-of-year book value of assets. Return is the cumulative stock return over the
fiscal year. Vega, Delta, Leverage, Book-to-Market, CashCompensation, and PP&E are winsorized at the
first and 99th percentiles.
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Table 2
Two-Stage Least Squares Results
Panel A: First-Stage Contract Design Equations

Log(Sales)
Leverage
Book-to-Market
Growth
CashCompensation
Tenure
PP&E
Cash
TaxLoss
ROA
Returnt
Returnt-1

Industry Indicators
R

2

Vega

Delta

Vega

Delta

0.336***
(14.96)
0.522***
(3.439)
-1.173***
(-10.26)
0.0151
(0.213)
0.402***
(12.01)
-0.018***
(-4.311)
-0.103
(-0.784)
0.940***
(4.799)
0.0963**
(2.082)
-0.640***
(-3.440)
-0.194***
(-7.054)
-0.073***
(-3.418)

0.382***
(22.58)
0.157
(1.187)
-2.221***
(-23.45)
0.495***
(7.530)
0.188***
(8.383)
0.066***
(20.32)
0.0272
(0.244)
0.655***
(4.048)
0.01000
(0.257)
0.275*
(1.646)
0.114***
(6.139)
0.078***
(4.494)

0.379***
(16.70)
0.464***
(3.150)
-1.001***
(-9.063)
-0.0115
(-0.167)
0.371***
(11.62)
-0.016***
(-4.034)
-0.388**
(-2.093)
0.740***
(3.752)
0.0410
(0.913)
-0.545***
(-2.885)
-0.174***
(-6.452)
-0.067***
(-3.159)

0.406***
(23.09)
0.113
(0.893)
-2.145***
(-23.08)
0.449***
(7.199)
0.152***
(7.011)
0.065***
(20.82)
-0.0649
(-0.432)
0.658***
(4.053)
-0.00625
(-0.168)
0.278*
(1.719)
0.133***
(7.315)
0.082***
(4.897)

No

No

Yes

Yes

34.1%

52.7%

38.0%

56.1%

2

2.1%

1.3%

1.4%

1.5%

Partial F-Statistics

24.78

13.21

16.78

17.42

Observations

13,233

13,233

12,987

12,987

Partial R

This table presents the results of the first-stage contract design equations when equity-portfolio sensitivity
to changes in stock return volatility (Vega) and equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta)
are treated as endogenous and are regressed on predetermined variables and the instruments. The
predetermined variables are Log(Salest), Leveraget, Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt,
Tenuret, and PP&Et. The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst, ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as
defined in the caption of Table 1. Industry Indicators are excluded in the first two columns and included in
the last two columns. When Industry indicators are included, each indicator takes a value of one for each
firm that has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. Partial R2 is the partial
R2 from including the instruments in the equations. Partial F-statistics are the partial F-statistics obtained
from including the instruments in the equations, and the associated p-value is reported below in
parentheses. Year indicators are included in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and
year indicators are not reported. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses and are
calculated based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 2 (continued)
Two-Stage Least Squares Results
Panel B: Second-Stage Risk-Profile Equations
Total
Risk
Log(Vega)

0.115***
(2.860)

Log(Delta)

0.283***
(4.748)

Systematic
Risk

0.006

-0.002

(4.431)

(0.181)

(-0.0996)

0.060*

0.289***

0.077***

(4.044)

(1.750)

(4.867)

(3.495)

-0.058***

-0.163***

-0.073***

-0.122***

-0.029**

(-5.261)

(-3.874)

(-4.825)

(-3.555)

(-4.446)

(-2.386)

-0.285***

-0.077***

-0.331***

-0.126***

-0.141**

-0.000

(-4.578)

(-2.989)

(-4.855)

(-3.632)

(-2.435)

(-0.00490)

0.857***

0.243***

0.825***

0.250**

0.801***

0.210***

(4.923)

(3.329)

(4.356)

(2.506)

(4.702)

(3.345)

Growth

-0.103**

-0.022

-0.124***

-0.030

-0.068*

-0.007

(-2.513)

(-1.301)

(-2.783)

(-1.296)

(-1.760)

(-0.478)

CashCompensation

-0.109***

-0.046***

-0.120***

-0.063***

-0.060***

-0.010

(-4.260)

(-4.030)

(-4.174)

(-4.003)

(-2.626)

(-1.036)

-0.017***

-0.003*

-0.015***

-0.001

-0.019***

-0.005***

(-4.497)

(-1.772)

(-3.615)

(-0.644)

(-5.061)

(-3.548)

0.007

0.057*

-0.402***

-0.050

0.575***

0.197***

(0.144)

(1.825)

(-8.137)

(-1.197)

(11.23)

(6.830)

Industry Indicators

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Hansen J-Statistics
(p-value)

0.65
(0.885)

3.92
(0.271)

1.36
(0.714)

4.33
(0.228)

7.12
(0.068)

10.92
(0.012)

Observations

13,233

12,987

13,233

12,987

13,233

12,987

Log(Sales)
Leverage
Book-to-Market

Tenure
PP&E

0.079***

0.149***

0.125***

(3.809)

(3.228)

0.069***

0.260***

(2.739)

-0.160***

Idiosyncratic
Risk

This table presents the second-stage regression results from the estimation of risk equations (1) - (3) using
two-stage least squares for the case when equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock return volatility
(Vega) and equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta) are treated as endogenous. The
predetermined variables are Log(Salest), Leveraget, Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt,
Tenuret, and PP&Et. The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst, ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as
defined in the caption of Table 1. When Industry Indicators are included, each indicator takes a value of
one for each firm that has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. Year
indicators are included in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and year indicators are not
reported. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses and are calculated based on
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 3
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation

Log(Vega)
Log(Delta)
Log(Sales)
Leverage
Book-to-Market
Growth
CashCompensation
Tenure
PP&E
Industry Indicators
Observations

Systematic
Risk

Idiosyncratic
Risk

Systematic
Risk

Idiosyncratic
Risk

0.149***
(3.074)
0.260***
(3.947)
-0.163***
(-4.461)
-0.331***
(-4.886)
0.825***
(4.163)
-0.124**
(-2.502)
-0.120***
(-3.965)
-0.015***
(-3.517)
-0.402***
(-8.007)

0.006
(0.173)
0.289***
(5.041)
-0.122***
(-4.569)
-0.141**
(-2.275)
0.801***
(4.930)
-0.068
(-1.643)
-0.060***
(-2.811)
-0.019***
(-5.080)
0.575***
(11.12)

0.125***
(5.105)
0.060**
(2.015)
-0.073***
(-4.049)
-0.126***
(-3.365)
0.250***
(2.877)
-0.030
(-1.528)
-0.063***
(-4.784)
-0.001
(-0.738)
-0.050
(-1.111)

-0.002
(-0.0946)
0.077***
(4.084)
-0.029**
(-2.467)
-0.000
(-0.00586)
0.210***
(3.808)
-0.007
(-0.495)
-0.010
(-1.093)
-0.005***
(-4.243)
0.197***
(6.809)

No

No

Yes

Yes

13,233

12,987

13,233

12,987

Comparison of coefficients on Log(Vega): Test for γ1>δ1 (Null Hypothesis: γ1= δ1)
γ1 - δ1
0.143
0.127
z-statistics
3.409
4.362
p-value
0.001
0.000
Comparison of coefficients on Log(Delta): Test of γ2>δ2 (Null Hypothesis: γ2= δ2)
γ2 – δ2
-0.029
-0.017
z-statistics
-0.487
-0.538
p-value
0.626
0.591
This table presents the results from the simultaneous estimation of Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) using three-stage
least squares for the case when equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock return volatility (Vega) and
equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta) are treated as endogenous. The predetermined
variables are Log(Salest), Leveraget, Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt, Tenuret, and PP&Et.
The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst, ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as defined in the
caption of Table 1. When Industry Indicators are included, each indicator takes a value of one for each firm
that has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. Year indicators are included
in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and year indicators are not reported. t-statistics
are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses and are calculated based on robust standard errors
obtained using clustered bootstrapping at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

- 48 -

Table 4
Two-Stage Least Squares With Endogenous Leverage
Panel A: First-Stage Contract Design Equations

Log(Sales)
Book-to-Market
Growth
CashCompensation
Tenure
PP&E
Cash
TaxLoss
ROA
Returnt
Returnt-1
Industry Indicators
R

2

Vega

Delta

Leverage

Vega

Delta

Leverage

0.341***
(15.25)
-1.137***
(-9.936)
0.037
(0.524)
0.409***
(12.18)
-0.018***
(-4.354)
-0.060
(-0.457)
0.791***
(4.094)
0.110**
(2.352)
-0.828***
(-4.419)
-0.191***
(-6.931)
-0.074***
(-3.469)

0.383***
(22.77)
-2.210***
(-23.55)
0.501***
(7.560)
0.190***
(8.457)
0.066***
(20.29)
0.040
(0.364)
0.610***
(3.825)
0.014
(0.361)
0.218
(1.327)
0.115***
(6.204)
0.078***
(4.505)

0.008***
(2.864)
0.069***
(4.402)
0.043***
(3.996)
0.013***
(4.136)
-0.001
(-1.453)
0.084***
(5.372)
-0.285***
(-11.62)
0.026***
(4.383)
-0.361***
(-9.219)
0.006**
(2.303)
-0.001
(-0.506)

0.383***
(16.97)
-0.974***
(-8.846)
0.007
(0.103)
0.374***
(11.65)
-0.016***
(-4.070)
-0.366**
(-1.967)
0.616***
(3.155)
0.053
(1.179)
-0.704***
(-3.761)
-0.173***
(-6.380)
-0.068***
(-3.218)

0.407***
(23.23)
-2.139***
(-23.18)
0.453***
(7.222)
0.153***
(7.019)
0.065***
(20.81)
-0.060
(-0.396)
0.628***
(3.885)
-0.003
(-0.0870)
0.239
(1.492)
0.134***
(7.350)
0.082***
(4.898)

0.009***
(3.159)
0.057***
(3.673)
0.040***
(3.974)
0.007**
(2.339)
-0.000
(-1.401)
0.047**
(2.192)
-0.268***
(-10.84)
0.027***
(4.680)
-0.344***
(-9.021)
0.004
(1.635)
-0.002
(-0.807)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

33.9%

52.7%

24.6%

37.9%

56.1%

31.5%

2

2.1%

1.2%

11.0%

1.4%

1.4%

10.3%

Partial F-Statistics

24.65

12.55

73.91

16.93

16.77

64.53

Observations

13,233

13,233

13,233

12,987

12,987

12,987

Partial R

This table presents the results of the first-stage contract design equations when equity-portfolio sensitivity
to changes in stock return volatility (Vega), equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta),
and Leverage are treated as endogenous and are regressed on predetermined variables and the instruments.
The predetermined variables are Log(Salest), Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt, Tenuret, and
PP&Et. The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst, ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as defined in
the caption of Table 1. Industry indicators are excluded in the first three columns and included in the last
three columns. When Industry Indicators are included, each indicator takes a value of one for each firm that
has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. Partial R2 is the partial R2 from
including the instruments in the equations. Partial F-statistics are the partial F-statistics obtained from
including the instruments in the equations, and the associated p-value is reported below in parentheses.
Year indicators are included in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and year indicators
are not reported. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses and are calculated based
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 4 (continued)
Two-Stage Least Squares With Endogenous Leverage
Panel B: Second-Stage Risk-Profile Equations
Total
Risk
Log(Vega)
Log(Delta)
Leverage

Systematic
Risk

Idiosyncratic
Risk

0.116***

0.083***

0.155***

0.135***

-0.007

-0.009

(2.738)

(3.547)

(3.010)

(4.021)

(-0.252)

(-0.561)

0.289***

0.085***

0.309***

0.100**

0.175***

0.047**

(3.807)

(2.582)

(3.430)

(2.087)

(3.020)

(1.983)

-0.266

-0.018

-0.169

0.018

-0.522***

-0.111*
(-1.826)

(-1.364)

(-0.196)

(-0.747)

(0.141)

(-3.540)

-0.162***

-0.066***

-0.184***

-0.093***

-0.073***

-0.013

(-4.183)

(-3.359)

(-3.953)

(-3.250)

(-2.644)

(-1.041)

0.868***

0.276***

0.921***

0.330***

0.575***

0.149**

(4.279)

(3.116)

(3.827)

(2.582)

(3.709)

(2.373)

-0.107**

-0.032

-0.156***

-0.054*

0.008

0.012

(-2.158)

(-1.525)

(-2.676)

(-1.804)

(0.225)

(0.769)

-0.111***

-0.050***

-0.134***

-0.073***

-0.028

-0.002

(-3.594)

(-3.667)

(-3.591)

(-3.672)

(-1.233)

(-0.159)

-0.017***

-0.004*

-0.017***

-0.004

-0.012***

-0.003**

(-3.636)

(-1.860)

(-3.156)

(-1.283)

(-3.329)

(-2.114)

0.005

0.057*

-0.418***

-0.051

0.612***

0.198***

(0.0989)

(1.712)

(-7.264)

(-1.118)

(13.44)

(7.316)

Industry Indicators

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Hansen J-Statistics
(p-value)

0.619
(0.734)

2.855
(0.240)

0.575
(0.750)

1.794
(0.408)

2.293
(0.318)

8.772
(0.013)

Observations

13,233

12,987

13,233

12,987

13,233

12,987

Log(Sales)
Book-to-Market
Growth
CashCompensation
Tenure
PP&E

This table presents the second-stage regression results from the estimation of risk equations (1) - (3) using
two-stage least squares for the case when equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock return volatility
(Vega), equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta), and Leverage are treated as
endogenous. The predetermined variables are Log(Salest), Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt,
Tenuret, and PP&Et. The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst, ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as
defined in the caption of Table 1. When Industry Indicators are included, each indicator takes a value of
one for each firm that has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. Year
indicators were included in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and year indicators are
not reported. t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses and are calculated based on
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 5
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation

Log(Vega)
Log(Delta)
Leverage
Log(Sales)
Book-to-Market
Growth
CashCompensation
Tenure
PP&E

Systematic
Risk

Idiosyncratic
Risk

Systematic
Risk

Idiosyncratic
Risk

0.155***
(2.823)
0.309***
(3.004)
-0.169
(-0.734)
-0.184***
(-3.601)
0.921***
(3.333)
-0.156**
(-2.545)
-0.134***
(-3.236)
-0.017***
(-2.860)
-0.418***
(-7.651)

-0.007
(-0.231)
0.175***
(2.863)
-0.522***
(-3.223)
-0.073**
(-2.447)
0.575***
(3.468)
0.008
(0.237)
-0.028
(-1.091)
-0.012***
(-3.310)
0.612***
(14.27)

0.135***
(3.316)
0.100
(1.527)
0.018
(0.113)
-0.093**
(-2.389)
0.330**
(1.966)
-0.054
(-1.318)
-0.073***
(-3.005)
-0.004
(-1.003)
-0.051
(-0.991)

-0.009
(-0.525)
0.047*
(1.928)
-0.111
(-1.588)
-0.013
(-0.969)
0.149**
(2.269)
0.012
(0.788)
-0.002
(-0.159)
-0.003**
(-2.018)
0.198***
(6.613)

No
No
Yes
Yes
Industry Indicators
13,233
12,987
13,233
12,987
Observations
Comparison of coefficients on Log(Vega): Test for γ1>δ1 (Null Hypothesis: γ1= δ1)
γ1 - δ1
0.163
0.144
z-statistics
2.986
3.523
p-value
0.003
0.000
Comparison of coefficients on Log(Delta): Test for γ2>δ2 (Null Hypothesis: γ2= δ2)
γ2 – δ2
0.134
0.053
z-statistics
1.502
1.217
p-value
0.133
0.224
This table presents the results from the simultaneous estimation of Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) using three-stage
least squares for the case when equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock return volatility (Vega),
equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta), and Leverage are treated as endogenous. The
predetermined variables are Log(Salest), Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt, Tenuret, and
PP&Et. The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst, ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as defined in
the caption of Table 1. When Industry Indicators are included, each indicator takes a value of one for each
firm that has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and zero otherwise. Year indicators are
included in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and year indicators are not reported. tstatistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses and are calculated based on robust
standard errors obtained using clustered bootstrapping at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided)
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 6
The Effect of Equity Incentives on Changes in Firms’
Risk Profiles From Acquisitions
Probability of
Increase in
Total Risk
Log(Vega)
Log(Delta)
Log(Sales)
Leverage
Book-to-Market
Growth

Probability of
Increase in
Systematic Risk

Probability of
Increase in
Idiosyncratic
Risk

0.227**

0.257**

0.189**

0.224**

-0.0456

-0.0783

(2.464)

(2.254)

(2.061)

(1.987)

(-0.406)

(-0.557)

-0.0200

-0.0151

0.0736

0.0585

0.211*

0.406***

(-0.215)

(-0.143)

(0.801)

(0.563)

(1.658)

(2.722)

-1.997***

-2.326***

-1.778***

-2.130***

1.459*

1.348

(-3.216)

(-2.948)

(-2.882)

(-2.728)

(1.949)

(1.366)

-0.000520

0.0147

-0.0446

-0.0405

-0.115

-0.179*

(-0.00842)

(0.197)

(-0.730)

(-0.550)

(-1.454)

(-1.881)

0.663***

0.682**

0.506**

0.513*

-0.0159

0.424

(2.664)

(2.368)

(2.048)

(1.805)

(-0.0535)

(1.147)

0.171

0.173

-0.00230

0.0214

-0.0721

-0.174

(1.503)

(1.587)

(-0.0207)

(0.200)

(-0.512)

(-1.266)

-0.041**

-0.052***

-0.044***

-0.054***

-0.060***

-0.044*

(-2.477)

(-2.686)

(-2.700)

(-2.857)

(-3.091)

(-1.874)

Tenure

0.097

0.107

-0.033

-0.029

-0.219*

-0.373***

(1.145)

(1.234)

(-0.400)

(-0.347)

(-1.897)

(-2.851)

PP&E

0.275**

-0.262

0.358***

-0.113

0.588***

0.348

(1.986)

(-1.287)

(2.594)

(-0.567)

(3.475)

(1.312)

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

3,559

3,559

3,559

3,559

3,559

3,559

CashCompensation

Industry Indicators
Observations

This table presents the probit regression results from estimating models with indicator variables that
compare the risk profile achieved from actual acquisitions and potential acquisitions using Newey’s
minimum chi-squared two-step estimator (Newey, 1987) for the case in which equity-portfolio sensitivity
to changes in stock return volatility (Vega), equity-portfolio sensitivity to changes in stock price (Delta),
and Leverage are treated as endogenous. The dependent variables in each specification are an indicator that
takes a value of one if the resulting level of total, systematic, or idiosyncratic risk respectively, of the
combined acquirer and actual target is greater than the level of the risk measure obtained for the combined
acquirer and the matched potential target, which is identified as the firm with the closest market
capitalization in the actual target’s two-digit SIC industry. The predetermined variables are Log(Salest),
Book-to-Markett, Growtht, CashCompensationt, Tenuret, and PP&Et. The instruments are Casht, TaxLosst,
ROAt, Returnt, and Returnt-1. All variables are as defined in the caption of Table 1. The coefficients on
Tenuret are multiplied by ten to facilitate their exposition. When Industry Indicators are included, each
indicator takes a value of one for each firm that has segment operations in that two-digit SIC industry and
zero otherwise. Year indicators are included in all the equations. Coefficient estimates for the industry and
year indicators are not reported. z-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses.
Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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